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The institution of  official platforms that call for, collect, and publish works in bur-
geoning fields of  inquiry is a crucial step in the legitimization and promotion of  re-
search in those areas. For instance, the 1982 founding of  Hypatia instituted a forum 
crucial for the shaping of  the discipline of  feminist philosophy itself, and also for 
those who research and teach in this field. While journals like PhiloSOPHIA, Inter-
national Journal of  Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (IJFAB), Radical Philosophy, and, more 
recently, Critical Philosophy of  Race and Latina Critical Feminism are contributing to the 
sedimentation of  fields such as feminist philosophy, critical philosophy of  race, and 
Latina feminism etc., to this day there is not a platform explicitly devoted to the pub-
lication of  pieces that engage the critical turn in phenomenology. Inspired by the in-
stitutional changes brought about by the establishment of  these journals, we decid-
ed to found what we are now proud to call Puncta: Journal of  Critical Phenomenology. 
     The journey of  its founding and the publication of  its first issue required nu-
merous conversations about the scope of  the journal, its target audience, the kinds 
of  publications that we hoped to solicit, and, perhaps most importantly, what we 
took “critical phenomenology” to be and to be doing. By founding this journal, we 
endorse and promote a specific kind of  phenomenological inquiry or method: a 
method already being deployed by contemporary feminist thinkers like Lisa Guen-
ther and Mariana Ortega. These scholars, inspired by the phenomenology of  Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty, Frantz Fanon, and Gloria Anzaldúa among others, conceive of  
critical phenomenology as a process of  inquiry that, grounded in the specificity of  
the phenomenon it seeks to describe, remains “on its way”—in terms of  both its de-
scription of  the phenomenon and its methodological presuppositions.   
     Given our indebtedness to feminist phenomenology and feminist phenomenolo-
gists, the reflection on the resonances between feminist phenomenology and critical 
phenomenology is essential to the delineation of  the contours of  the field of  critical 
phenomenology. Our designation of  the term critical phenomenology is not meant 
to mark a limit or an inadequacy in what is now widely recognized and accepted as 
feminist phenomenology proper, but rather, to suggest that feminist phenomenology 
and philosophies of  social and political critique are already inherently implicated with 
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one another (this topic is taken up by Bonnie Mann in the article featured in this is-
sue). Critical phenomenology understands that feminist phenomenology exists within 
broader structures of  power that shape, condition, and determine experience. And all 
critical phenomenology is inherently—if  not explicitly—feminist insofar as it attends 
to experiences of  difference and differences in experience. The founding of  Puncta is 
motivated by the hope that having a specific outlet for critical phenomenology will 
help to establish it as its own field, and to invite scholars to engage their phenomeno-
logical work in a way that attends to those differences.       
     Inspired by Roland Barthes’ concept punctum, we take Puncta here to indicate crit-
ical phenomenology’s continuity with and divergence from the traditions of  both 
classical and feminist phenomenology. In the movement from punctum to puncta, we 
move from one point to many; we move from phenomenology to a phenomenolog-
ical approach that continuously questions its own practices, methods, and assump-
tions, and is thus revealed as always already multiple.     
     In his phenomenological investigations of  photographs, Barthes introduced the 
punctum and studium as two elements of  an image that may grab the interest of  a 
viewer. The studium refers to everything in the image that is average, cultural, that 
reveals itself  to the viewer because of  their participation in a shared body of  knowl-
edge. Through attendance to the studium, intellectual inquiries can exalt an image 
from bearing merely personal interest to a general interest through the image’s instan-
tiation as an indexical counterpart to a historical period. Phenomenology’s attendance 
to the complex forces constitutive of  lived experience makes it well-suited to reveal and 
critique the studium. While the studium situates the viewer comfortably in relation to 
the image, it is not what holds one’s interest. Intellectual exercises and phenomenolog-
ical inquiries that are self-satisfied with the studium still bear a sovereign, disinterest-
ed gaze over the objects of  perception.       
     The punctum is a “sharp point” that disturbs or disrupts the studium. It is a small 
detail that draws us away from the image’s acquired cultural significance and towards 
something else that exceeds the historical frame, namely, the singularity of  the body 
that the image makes seen—the fragile, finite body of  the referent. What is revealed 
in the detail is not strictly an object but a feeling—an affective connection to others 
that the natural attitude holds at a distance. It is no longer the case that this image is 
interesting on a merely intellectual level; it touches me by cutting and wounding me. 
This affective connection entails that the phenomenologist will, like the objects of  their 
inquiry, be left exposed and transformed by the encounter.     
     Puncta reveal what is at stake in a critical phenomenology. When the phenomenol-
ogist is not another transcendental subject that gazes sovereignly over the objects of  
perception, but one that makes themselves exposed, that desires not merely to gaze but 
to be gazed at in turn and be transformed by what is seen, then that phenomenologist 
makes possible an encounter with the life that exceeds its historical context and cannot 
be reduced to the conditions of  its existence. The punctum is, quite literally, the point—
of  a phenomenology that aims to be critical, that is, a phenomenology for which the 
call made infamous in Marx’s thesis still resounds. The goal is not merely to describe 
the world, but to change it (and to be changed by it). 
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As the previous reflections indicate, the definition of  critical phenomenology as a disci-
pline in its own right remains one of  the most difficult questions at stake in this intellec-
tual inquiry, and is the topic of  this inaugural issue. Stated broadly: If  phenomenology 
is a descriptive practice, then critical phenomenology questions the conditions of  the 
possibility of  a phenomenological description and, in so doing, modifies the scope, con-
tent, and method of  said description. Our objects of  inquiry are always moving, and 
are never static. They are the institutions, structures, and social conditions which in-
form our daily lives. Critical phenomenology moves with these phenomena; understands 
that the structures of  experience are structured and experienced in a multitude of  ways, and we 
thus consider our project as calling on phenomenological analyses of  race, gender, class, 
etc.   
     At a methodological level, critical phenomenology challenges the assumption that a 
“pure” phenomenological description (and the complete suspension of  the natural atti-
tude it requires) is possible and that phenomenological conclusions can be arrived at 
with certainty; it asks what the epoché or initial shift from the natural attitude consists in, 
and if  or how the subject position of  the phenomenologist is relevant to phenomeno-
logical description. Importantly, taking these issues seriously demands that critical phe-
nomenology reconsiders the way it investigates and approaches the phenomena it seeks 
to describe; it invites the development of  what Merleau-Ponty would call an indirect 
phenomenological description.     
     But if  the “essences” of  phenomena are revealed as being “impure,” structured by 
socio-political institutions, if  phenomenological conclusions cannot be certain, or if  the 
epoché does not completely suspend the values and assumptions of  the natural attitude, 
then this broadens the scope of  the conditions of  the possibility of  phenomenology: 
insofar as those conditions include particular social contexts, phenomenology ceases to 
be a strictly a priori and value-neutral discipline. Under these conditions, critical phe-
nomenology concerns itself  with the norms and values that shape both the natural at-
titude of  the phenomenologist and the phenomena she seeks to describe, thereby taking 
on a normative dimension.        
     As critical phenomenologists, then, we question both phenomenology’s role as “pure” 
methodology, and the underlying assumptions of  the methodology itself. We engage in 
a double critical matrix which seeks to engage phenomenology as a social and political 
practice over and against methodology, as well as engage in the consistent practice of  
questioning the assumptions and import of  the method(s) themselves. In this sense, the 
task of  critical phenomenology in elucidating these phenomena and its own approach 
to them is never finished. Critical phenomenology is an ongoing process of  exposing 
the structures of  structures, and of  challenging exhaustive understanding through a 
commitment to tailor methodology to the shape-shifting objects of  inquiry. In critiqu-
ing phenomenology, then, we can say that critical phenomenology takes up  the task of  
social critique.     
     Despite its distinct elements—and analogously to its relation with feminist phenom-
enology—this conception of  critical phenomenology does not constitute a historical 
break with phenomenology. Phenomenology has repeatedly questioned its own origin 
and possibility. It has also been questioned and challenged by others: Since we cannot 
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perform a complete suspension of  the natural attitude, critics have argued, phenome-
nology as a discipline fails, falling into solipsism and subjectivism, which is to say that it 
never attains to a rigorous science. In other words,  given the impossibility of  a complete 
reduction, there can be no pure phenomenological description of  experience as such. 
     However, listening to phenomenology itself, i.e., to its “failures,” teaches us that what 
is most important about the phenomenological method is that it can neither be reduced 
to a first-person view nor arrive at a purely descriptive account of  reality. (These are 
some of  the themes guiding Gayle Salamon’s essay featured in this issue.) Husserl him-
self  seems to have come to the recognition that a  phenomenological investigation can-
not stop at static phenomenology, i.e., at a phenomenology that investigates the inten-
tional structures of  consciousness (e.g., temporality or noetic-noematic constitution). In 
fact, as Husserl suggests, static phenomenology serves as a leading clue to genetic phe-
nomenology, which attempts to uncover the genesis of  meaning and sense.   
     Unlike static phenomenology, genetic phenomenology is a phenomenology of  factic-
ity: the focus of  its investigation are the types and typicalities that we experience in the 
lifeworld, and how these types or typicalities came/come to be. This is to say that ge-
netic phenomenology seeks to make explicit the necessary structures that are constitu-
tive of  the institution of  stylized persons, identities, etc. This is done via what Husserl 
calls the imaginative or eidetic method, a technique in which we imaginatively change 
or vary the different characteristics of  a phenomenon that appears to us. Through do-
ing this, Husserl argues, we can arrive at what is invariant, i.e., the eidetic structures of  
the phenomenon we study.      
     Through the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, phenomenology 
reveals its own impossibility as a pure descriptive practice. In fact, we, as phenomenol-
ogists, can only perform the eidetic variation from within an intersubjective world. It is 
true that the goal of  Husserl’s eidetic variation is to remove the object of  our analysis 
“from all factualness [so that it becomes] the pure ‘eidos’” (Husserl 1999, 70). However, 
the subject (the monad) who performs an eidetic variation has “a surrounding world, 
which is continuously ‘existing for [them]’” (Husserl 1999, 68). This means that the 
monad’s situatedness in an intersubjective world is crucial to genetic phenomenology. 
Intuiting essences via the eidetic reduction “depends on a freely and arbitrarily produc-
ible multiplicity of  variants attaining coincidence, on an open infinity” (Husserl 1973, 
342). But, we are only able to imaginatively vary a multiplicity of  possibilities because 
they have been, prior to the eidetic analysis, given to us through our lived experience. 
That is, it is only though our bodily situatedness, our relation with others, and our cul-
tural life-world that we can experience these possibilities as contingent, factual determi-
nations of  the objects that we are eidetically analyzing. Significantly, this means that the 
process by which we intuit an essence cannot be entirely abstracted from the particular-
ities of  concrete existence. Genetic phenomenology is inherently intersubjective: in per-
forming an eidetic reduction, we cannot drop away and rise above the sedimented lay-
ers of  our concrete life-world.  
     For us, the intersubjective and situated nature of  phenomenology, in sum, the impos-
sibility of  a complete reduction, does not entail leaving behind phenomenology. Rather, 
it means that phenomenology carries with it a responsibility: phenomenology is, to quote 
Merleau-Ponty, “implicated in the movement [of  Being] and does not view it from 
above” (1968, 90).      
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     If  we recognize this, i.e., the situatedness of  genetic phenomenology, we realize that 
“phenomenology does not only describe essences, and in particular social essences, but 
participates in the ethical becoming of  the social structures or essences that the phe-
nomenologist describes” (Steinbock 1995, 14-15). Just as static phenomenology serves 
as a leading clue into genetic phenomenology, we suggest that genetic phenomenology 
—in both its failures and its insights—serves as a leading clue into a critical phenomenology. 
Critical phenomenology is thus continuous with the historical origins of  phenomenol-
ogy, but it is not nascent in Husserlian phenomenology. To make that claim would only 
reify a conception of  phenomenology as allegiant to a Husserlian “foundation” which 
may not exist as a singular method. Critical phenomenology is defined by not taking for 
granted such a foundation. That said, a critical phenomenologist need not reject the 
Husserlian ideals of  pure phenomenological description or a complete suspension of  
the natural attitude. Rather, for a defender of  those ideals, critical phenomenology calls 
for a robust defense of  these possibilities and thereby encourages debate on the proper 
scope and object of  phenomenology and the methodological and political responsibili-
ties of  the phenomenologist. For those who believe that phenomenological description 
is never neutral and always situated or value-laden, critical phenomenology calls for a 
plausible alternative conception of  the discipline. We hope that within this journal, 
through vigorous debate and a shared concern with the enabling conditions of  phe-
nomenology, such a conception may be formulated and found.    
We are happy to feature four invited submissions by Lisa Guenther, Kym Maclaren, 
Bonnie Mann, and Gayle Salamon, all of  whom respond to the questions motivat-
ing our inaugural issue. Both Salamon and Maclaren offer a response to the question 
“What is critical phenomenology?” by exploring the productive relationship between 
critical theory and phenomenology. Salamon does this by tracing the history of  the 
term critical phenomenology. Maclaren further explores the productive relationship be-
tween critical theory and phenomenology en route to her analysis of  intimacy. Focusing 
on the phenomena of  shame and long-term solitary confinement, Mann and Guenther 
take up that question by performing the work of  critical phenomenology. Mann also offers 
suggestions regarding critical or, as she calls it, feminist phenomenology’s relation to the 
tradition—both of  classical phenomenology and feminist philosophy. Guenther shows 
how the work of  critical phenomenology is already at play in the practices of  resistance 
among prisoners in the Security Housing Unit of  Pelican Bay State Prison in California. 
     Driving Salamon’s article “What’s Critical About Critical Phenomenology?” is the 
question “what does critical theory bring to phenomenological inquiry?” To answer 
this question, she traces the origin of  the term “critical phenomenology” back to Donn 
Welton and Hugh Silverman’s 1987 text, Critical and Dialectical Phenomenology. Here, 
classical phenomenology is contrasted with critical phenomenology, which Salamon 
describes as “rooted in the classical tradition at the same time as it somehow moved be-
yond those boundaries, in terms of  either content or method or discipline” (8). In con-
versation with Merleau-Ponty, Salamon points to how phenomenology in fact must be 
a double reflection that critically examines not only various kinds of  knowledge, but also 
itself  as critical practice. Simultaneously challenging a view of  phenomenology as “too 
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trapped inside first-person perspective to be able to offer any purchase on ethical or po-
litical struggles” and that of  critical theory as too structurally focused, too ‘high-altitude’ 
… to be able to offer any insight into the intimate textures of  lived experience,” Salam-
on shows us how phenomenology, at its best, was always critical—just as good critical 
theory has always been attuned to or at least motivated by personal experience (11). 
     Maclaren’s “Intimacy as Transgression and the Problem of  Freedom” continues 
to reflect on the relation between critical theory and phenomenology  in its relation 
to freedom. Problematically, she suggests, critical theory is geared toward a version 
of  emancipation that upholds a neoliberal, Cartesian model of  agency, where free-
dom means freedom from the various institutions which are understood to be exter-
nal to the subject. Phenomenology, too, is directed toward the subject’s freedom, but 
makes explicit that various institutions (both personal and socio-political) “transgress 
into our experience and constitute the very manner in which we perceive … the 
possibilities we find available … and the positions that we … assume” (19). Maclar-
en fleshes this insight out via a critical phenomenology of  intimacy. In concrete inti-
macy, she argues, partners are co-intentionalities constituting a shared reality, which 
is sustained by mutual transgressions, and sustains in turn the genuine becoming of  
both partners. What this means is that each of  the partners is, in a real way, respon-
sible for the other. Neither is fully free to be themselves but experiences a freedom 
that is grounded on a dispossession of  themselves through the other’s transgressions. 
     Whereas Maclaren’s paper focuses more on our interpersonal relations, each 
of  which gives us access to a site of  transgressions more primordial than even the 
most natural of  institutions, Mann’s “The Difference of  Feminist Phenomenology: 
The Case of  Shame” shifts critical phenomenology’s focus to the material institu-
tions that structure both our experiences and the phenomenological tradition itself. 
Refusing to see feminist phenomenology as a mere application of  traditional, “rev-
erent” phenomenology, Mann argues that the practice of  feminist phenomenolo-
gy changes the very meaning of  phenomenology itself.       
     Drawing out the methodology of  Simone de Beauvoir’s phenomenology, Mann 
details phenomenology’s feminist transformation. With Beauvoir, we come to un-
derstand the phenomenological epoché not as a complete bracketing of  prejudic-
es, but as a slow reorientation of  our embodied consciousness that requires working 
through prejudices by actively taking up other perspectives. At the same time, phe-
nomenology itself  becomes an oscillating movement between the micro-level of  in-
tense concrete experiences and the macro-level of  general experience. Mann argues 
that this movement brings us to “a consciousness burdened by material interests, ex-
perience shaped by situation, and “ontology entangled with ethical failure and polit-
ical injustice” (57). Through the insightful analysis of  shame that follows—in which 
Mann puts Beauvoir’s critical, feminist phenomenology to work—Mann propos-
es two modalities of  shame defined by different temporal structures. Whereas un-
bounded shame closes off the future and undoes the self, ubiquitous shame pervades 
the lives of  women and promises the possibility of  a future redemption while always 
threatening to collapse into unbounded shame.      
     Just as Mann thematizes feminist phenomenology as process of  orientation or os-
cillation, in “Unmaking and Remaking the World in Long-Term Solitary Confine-
ment,” Guenther offers a vision of  critical phenomenology as transformative prac-
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tice. In her discussion of  resistance practices among prisoners in the Security Housing 
Unit of  Pelican Bay State Prison in California, Guenther analyses the “weaponized 
architecture of  solitary confinement” that becomes an apparatus of  torture by impos-
ing isolation on inherently relational, sentient, and social beings. Drawing on Elaine 
Scarry, Guenther argues that this imposed isolation—insofar as “the world … is a 
web of  relations whose meaning is grounded in praxis and in Being-with Others—
is an “unmaking of  the world.” Through an improbable effort of  communication 
through the concrete walls, the prisoners were able to force open a space of  emerg-
ing solidarity and shape a sense of  community, and an understanding of  themselves 
as what Guenther calls a “prisoner class,” which became a tool for political engage-
ment and resistance. That is, “[t]he embodied social practice of  speaking across both 
the material barriers of  institutionalized racism is already a ‘remaking of  the world’ 
and a form of  resistive architecture” (84). In the midst of  these conditions, prison-
ers have transformed spaces of  isolation into spaces of  resistance. Resistant transfor-
mative practices are, Guenther suggests, “the work of  critical phenomenology” (80). 
     Through their phenomenological interrogations of  social institutions, lived experi-
ences, and phenomenology itself, these articles shed light not only on the critical poten-
tial of  phenomenology, but also on phenomenology’s demand for responsible critique. 
We hope that you, the reader, find in this inaugural issue resources  for further thought 
and critique. 
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